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Topological Network Properties of the European Football Loan System
Abstract
Research Question: Following a network perspective, we present footballs European loan 
system as an economic network and aim to answer the following questions; (i) what is the 
structure of the network? and, (ii) what are the topological properties of the network?
Research Methods: Using data on the top-5 European leagues in European football 8139 loan 
transactions between 31/12/2009 – 22/12/2017 were analysed using social network analysis.
Results and Findings: The results show that the loan system is embedded in ongoing structural 
relationships across Europe, more so in the Italian Serie A than other European leagues 
investigated. Additionally, our findings indicate that several elite clubs are extracting value 
from the loan system, while others are value creators. 
Implications: The implications of this research are fourfold: recommendations for executive-
level professionals in the football industry and how to maximise the structure of the system; 
considerations for UEFA and FIFA policy around regulations applied to loan systems; 
application of economic network theory to the trading (loan) system in European football; and 
recommendations for future academic research. 
KEYWORDS: Economic Networks, Football, Trading Systems, Markets, Social Network 
Analysis
 
Page 1 of 51
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/resm





























































For Peer Review Only
Introduction
The demand from association football (herein football) firms (clubs) for superior playing talent 
means expenditure has seen exponential growth; for example, expenditure on international 
transfers only has increased by 33% from 2016 to $6.37billion in 2017 (FIFA, 2018). The 
implications are twofold. First, smaller revenue-generating firms lack the financial capacity to 
compete in the transfer market to attract quality talent resources, and second, large revenue-
generating clubs can operate large player rosters, stockpiling elite and younger talent. 
Consequently, these two implications have meant the loan system – whereby a firm may 
‘borrow' a player and often gaining access to their services otherwise unobtainable – has 
become integral to the operation of football across Europe, and the globe. 
The loan system is an integral part of a wider transfer system in place across Europe, 
whereby club A lends a player(s) to club B at an economic cost for a limited temporal period. 
If we accept the narrative that European professional sport firms are utility-maximisers, 
meaning profit comes second to obtaining superior talent maximizing potential win success 
(Caruso, Addesa, & Di Domizio, 2019; Noll, 2002, 2003; Zimbalist, 2002), then being able to 
attract high-quality playing talent is fundamental to success within the football market. 
However, while offering an opportunity to smaller revenue-generating clubs, large revenue-
generating clubs have been accused of ‘abusing' the system through the amount of stockpiling 
(Magowan, 2015). This narrative has led to football's global governing body Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) considering regulation on the loan system (BBC, 
2018; Wiegmann, 2018). It seems, however, this decision lacks any empirical support, mainly 
as there is little to no empirical research on the loan system. Therefore, this paper begins to fill 
this gap by providing an initial analysis of the current structure of the loan system. This will 
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allow football’s stakeholders, particularly governing bodies, clubs, and player representatives 
can be better informed when agreeing to any regulations on the loan system. 
To do so, we view the ‘loan’ as a unique temporal transaction, whereby football clubs 
temporarily transfer playing talent assets to another club, as such creates a transaction network 
within the football industry. Given the relational components of the economic transaction in 
the loan system, it is difficult to conceptualise it as purely theoretical adherence to neoclassical 
economic models. To address this, we adopt a network perspective from an economic 
sociology paradigm which addresses much of limitations within mainstream econometric 
modelling (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). Crucially, we follow economic sociology work by Knoke 
(2012), Granovetter (1985) and Burt (1992) to provide an initial descriptive analysis to 
understand:
1) What are the topological properties of the European loan system network? 
2) Do the topological properties demonstrate a structure within the European Loan 
system?
The main contribution of our paper is that it provides the first analysis of the loan system 
operated across European football, addressing a current gap within the sport management 
literature. Furthermore, it contributes a novel methodology for analysing economic networks 
within sport management through social network analysis (SNA). Finally, it informs industry 
decision-makers from club management and board room executives, through to national 
governing bodies and footballs global governing body FIFA. Accordingly, this paper is 
structured by initially identifying how we conceptualise the European loan system within the 
sport economic literature. The network perspective will be explored to clarify our position, 
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which will set up the analysis. There will be a description of the data, as well as the measures 
used to analyse the topological properties of the loan system. The results will be presented, 
which will be followed by an overall discussion, summarised with concluding remarks. 
Review of Relevant Literature
The Loan System
There is a common acceptance that sport businesses, especially within professional team sports, 
operate differently to mainstream firms, leading Neale (1964, p. 1) to term the ‘Peculiar 
Economics of Professional Teams Sports’. A central tenant to this uniqueness is the 
unprecedented level of collaboration and cooperation required by professional sport firms to 
not only create the product on the pitch but for survival off the pitch (Fort & Quirk, 2004). This 
cooperative environment is more than merely just creating the ‘product’ (the game itself) and 
manifests itself through many cross-subsidisation mechanisms, which either equalise talent 
distribution (for example, reverse draft systems, salary caps) or revenue distribution (for 
example, sharing broadcasting revenue, gate receipts). 
These mechanisms, regardless of focus, aim to equalise resource capacity between large 
and small revenue-generating sport firms. Thes mechanisms are crucial to leagues success as 
Quirk's (1987) classic work identified the cartel-like nature of sports leagues, with one 
uniqueness – sports leagues sell competition (Quirk & Fort, 1995). This notion of selling 
competition, or what Rotternberg (1956) termed uncertainty-of-outcome, led to competitive 
balance becoming a prominent theoretical construct in the management of professional team 
sports literature (Kringstad, 2018; Schreyer & Torgler, 2018). Research on competitive balance 
– which identifies how well playing talent quality and financial strength is distributed between 
teams in a league (Owen & King, 2015; Ramchandani, Plumley, Boyes, & Wilson, 2018) – has 
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been dichotomously categorised into, analysis of competitive balance (ACB) and uncertainty-
of-outcome hypothesis (UOH) research (Fort & Maxcy, 2003). It is the former ACB body of 
literature that deals with the cartel-like nature of sports leagues, investigating the impact of 
market restrictions imposed by leagues on competitive balance. 
Generally, sports leagues either impose regulations on the distribution of talent (such 
as the draft system operated across North American sports) and/or money (such as revenue 
sharing/pooling agreements). Accordingly, a large body of research has focussed on the draft 
system, salary caps and/or revenue sharing systems such as gate receipts or broadcasting 
revenues (Dietl, Grossmann, & Lang, 2011; Dietl, Lang, & Rathke, 2011; Feess & Stähler, 
2009; Hill & Jolly, 2017; Peeters, 2015; Rockerbie & Easton, 2018; Szymanski, 2016; 
Szymanski & Kesenne, 2004; Wilson, Ramchandani, & Plumley, 2018; York & Miree, 2018). 
However, within a European context, no scholarly work to date has gone beyond financial 
distribution cross-subsidisation mechanisms. Which is interesting as there exists a much larger 
embedded cross-subsidisation mechanism operated across global football, often driven by 
European leagues, the loan system. 
While there is little to no known research on the loan system, we can take the basic 
principle, that is, higher revenue-generating firms supporting the lower revenue-generating 
firms, as such loan system, can and should be considered a cross-subsidisation mechanism 
employed across the global football industry. For example, the loan system generally operates 
with football firms with large resource capabilities ‘loaning’ players (resource) to firms with 
smaller resource capabilities – either domestically or internationally (Simmons, 2007). Often, 
but not always, clubs with larger rosters (resource capabilities) represent larger revenue-
generating clubs, and smaller rosters represent smaller revenue generating clubs. 
Indeed, this system has become more established and sophisticated, going from a more 
flexible system to assist clubs with injury problems or to support opportunity for talent 
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development, to a strategic business strategy through to strategic alliances and value 
generation. Indeed, to some degree, this system can be considered pareto improvement as it 
benefits both lending club – the player receives experience and playing time, potentially 
increasing resource value – and, borrowing club – as they utilise the services of the resource 
for the duration of the loan, which would have been inaccessible, theoretically improving the 
firm’s output (team performance) and potentially win success, temporarily. Therefore, such a 
system provides opportunities for firms to develop official and unofficial collaborations, as it 
essentially operates as a “contractual asset pooling or resource exchange agreement between 
firms” (Stuart, 1998, p. 668). It is our position that these collaborations that make the firms 
(clubs) in the football industry interlinked creating patterned dyad and triad connections, and 
in the process forming what Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) note networks of pipes through which 
flow information and resources. It is this web of temporal transactions context we draw on 
network theory to explore and analyse much-needed insight into the characteristics of the loan 
system.
The Network Perspective
Economic sociology focusses on the structure of economic action through networks (Burt, 
1992; Granovetter, 1985, 2005). To follow Knoke's (2012, p. 15) operational definition: 
“economic sociology is the use of sociological ideas to analyze economic phenomena”, we 
argue that the loan system within Europe is an economic phenomenon, which can be – and 
should be – analysed through the economic sociology paradigm. Therefore, to analyse these 
structures of loan transactions, we adopt a network perspective, which has developed from 
economic sociology (Chayko, 2015). Underpinned by social network analysis (SNA) this 
perspective cuts across many social science disciplines, including; biology, physics, 
management consulting, public health, criminology (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2018; Scott, 
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2017; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Therefore, it is a multidisciplinary perspective that places 
structure at the centre of any analysis of human and economic life, as identified by (Knoke, 
2012, p. 21);
The web of ties among actors in a social system comprises the larger contexts that affect 
the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and actions of individuals and groups. Social influence 
and collective action may be both facilitated and constrained by direct and indirect 
transactions among actors possessing diverse resources, such as information, money, 
authority, and power. 
Knoke’s inspiration comes from seminal work by Granovetter (1985), which not only paved 
the way for the ‘new' economic sociology but placed networks as the key to economic activity. 
Furthermore, Granovetter (1985) laid out a theory of embeddedness, stipulating how 
economic behaviour is embedded structurally and relationally in relationships.  As such, all 
economic behaviour is rooted and embedded in social relations, meaning economic behaviour, 
such as sharing assets through the loan system, is structured – influenced by social interactions 
and relationships. Therefore, embeddedness works on the premise that economic actors 
(players, clubs, countries, federations) are impacted by; connections to others, their position 
they occupy in the wider structure, and, by the structure of the overall network. Indeed, such 
an idea is contrary to the neo-classical frameworks dominant in economics (Dacin, Beal, & 
Ventresca, 1999; Dobbin, 2004; Granovetter, 1992) especially sport economics, which is based 
on utility maximisation and rational atomised actors, favouring placing greater emphasis on 
how position and structure constrain behaviour. 
Granovetter (2017) identified four theoretical frameworks that underpinned his 
formulation of embeddedness. Firstly, the idea of density and cohesion, whereby norms of 
conventions (for example trust) and shared ideas and behaviour are impacted upon by the size, 
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density, and how cohesive the network structure is. Second, the strength of weak ties, while 
strong ties reinforce trust and bonding, new information and innovation come from weak ties 
who tap into other areas of the structure. Third, Ronald Burt's (1992) theory of ‘structural 
holes', which notes the importance of the position of an actor (corporate or human) in a network 
– especially concerning the advantage that it can create. For Burt, individual or organisations 
with ties into multiple networks that are otherwise unconnected enjoy a competitive and 
strategic advantage. In such a situation, the said actor spans what Burt calls a structural hole, 
thus controlling what is flowing through the network. Being in such a strategic potion allows 
them to exploit the structural hole in the networks they join (Burt, 1992). Individuals are 
effectively brokers and can thus leverage and trade-off what is flowing, be it money or 
information. Finally, temporal embeddedness, which suggests transactions or interactions have 
a past, that is, all micro-interactions form to generate the global structure, if this structure 
persists over time it may come to represent an institution, this global structure then impacts 
back upon the present and future interactions. Consequently, it is our view that the European 
loan system is based on temporal transactions in a structure, providing a testbed for analysis 
through a structural network perspective, focusing on the duality of structural and relational 
embeddedness. 
Networks and Sport Management Research
There is a developing body of literature applying network thinking principles and social 
network analysis since Quatman and Chelladurai (2008a, 2008b) set forth a research agenda 
for sport management scholars. Given the multidisciplinary nature of social network analysis 
and the sport management discipline, this body of research covers a wide range of topics (cf. 
Hambrick, 2019, for a full review). Two recent popular topics are sport performance (Lusher, 
Robins, & Kremer, 2010) and social media (Hambrick, 2019). Within sports performance the 
topics remain very broad, for example, Fransen et al. (2015) applied social network analysis to 
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investigate shared leadership within sports teams, concluding no difference in coach and athlete 
leaders, yet the latter were perceived to be more motivational leaders. Contrastingly, Beggs, 
Shepherd, Emmonds, & Jones (2017) applied network theory, notably the PageRank algorithm, 
to rank athlete performance. The works on social media are less broad and tend to focus on 
Twitter networks (Hambrick, 2012; Naraine & Parent, 2016; Yan, Pegoraro, & Watanabe, 
2018; Yan, Watanabe, Shapiro, Naraine, & Hull, 2018). Analysing the Twitter networks of two 
sports organisations, Naraine and Parent (2016) applied Bonacich (Beta) centrality and 
core/periphery analysis to identify the prominent/critical stakeholders in the networks.
Similarly, Yan et al. (2018) analysed the UEFA Champions League Final twitter 
discovering large sporting enterprises and sports stars were integral to the network formation 
and stability throughout its evolution. Comparably, Cleland, Doidge, Millward and Widdop's 
(2018) found similar results analysing the collective action within Liverpool Football Club fans 
while protesting ticket prices. While noting the importance of these works to the development 
of the sport management literature applying social network analysis, and thus arguably, 
implicitly economic sociology, the relevance to the present study is limited. 
More relevant sport management literature applying social network analysis focusses 
on sport organisation networks (Jones, Edwards, Bocarro, Bunds, & Smith, 2018; Sallent, 
Palau, & Guia, 2011; Wäsche, 2015; Wäsche & Woll, 2013). For example, Sallent et al. (2011) 
identified the importance of inter-organisational and cross-sectoral weak ties to the success of 
sports events as well as the role embeddedness plays in delivering a successful event, implicitly 
supporting Granovetter's (1983, 1985) work. Equally, Wäsche (2015) found, among other 
things, that inter-organisational cooperation was more likely with organisations in a closed 
triad, demonstrating how embeddedness creates trust among organisations, again implicit 
support for Granovetter’s (1985; 2017) work. The most relevant work within sport 
management literature is those using network theory to investigate the transfer market (Bond, 
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Widdop & Chadwick, 2018; Liu, Liu, Lu, Wang & Wang, 2016). Especially, Bond, et al. 
(2018) who explicitly applied economic sociology principles to the transfer network of 
emerging countries within world football. They found that European countries act as brokers 
between the emerging countries, deriving power through an advantageous position. 
Nevertheless, the present study focuses on a different form of economic transaction to football 
transfers by analysing loan transactions between football clubs. Therefore, not only does it add 
the first empirical article to investigate the loan system within football, but it also adds to the 
growing body of sport management literature applying social network analysis through an 
economic sociology theoretical framework.  
Methodology
Before establishing the methodological process employed in this research, social network 
analysis requires a boundary to be first established (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). Following the 
nominalist view (Knoke & Yang, 2008), the boundary for the European loan network 
compromises of the top-5 European leagues according to Deloitte (2018), which are England’s 
Premier League, Spain’s La Liga, Germany’s Bundesliga, Italy’s Serie A, and French’s Ligue 
1. The data gathered for this study included 8139 loan transactions involving clubs in the 
respective leagues from 31/12/2009 – 22/12/2017, which was all available data at the time of 
data collection. As we are only interested in loan transactions, we do not account for permanent 
transfers, free agent moves, length of the loan, a player returning from loan, or whether a loan 
deal is cut short. We are only concerned with the initial engagement between club A and club 
B within the loan transaction. Following Liu, et al. (2016) and Bond, et al. (2018) data was 
initially sourced from www.soccerway.com, which is operated by Opta Sports Limited who 
provide data to key organisations throughout the industry. For robustness and to validate the 
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data, we cross-examined with other data sources such as www.transfermarkt.com, as well as 
official club sites. 
Utilising social network analysis methodology employed in this study requires a brief 
explanation of graph theory, which became the bedrock of social network analysis after 
Cartwright and Harary's (1977) work. A graph (or network) describes a set of nodes (or 
vertices, or actors) which are connected through a set of edges (or ties, or links). These edges 
connect nodes through an array of interactions and/or relationships (For a more in-depth 
introduction to social network analysis see; Vega-Redondo, 2007; Wasserman & Faust, 2009). 
The notation within graph theory follows G = (V, L), identifying that graph G is comprised of 
a set of nodes, V, and a set of edges, L, or L∈V×V (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Within the 
European loan network of 8139 collective loans under investigation we identify n = 1105 nodes 
(football clubs) involved within the loan system, thus V = (1, 2, 3, …, 1105), with 5331 unique 
edges (loan connections) between them, thus L = (1, 2, 3, …, 5331). Note the edges within the 
network is less than the observed loan transaction, suggesting 2808 were between clubs with a 
pre-existing loan partner. 
As the edges within the study follow the direction of the loan deal from a lending club, 
i, to a borrowing club, j, these are often termed arcs transforming the graph into a digraph – 
simply a directed graph (something flows from one point to another, but may or may not be 
reciprocated). As such, Lij ∈ {0,1}, where Lij = 1 showing a loan relationship and Lij = 0 where 
a loan relationship does not exist. This is represented in an asymmetric n x n adjacency matrix, 
A. This means a loan relationship is not assumed between Lji just because of the loan 
relationship between Lij.
We can also weight the arc to account for the number of times loan deals are made 
between two clubs, which creates a weighted digraph, and can be noted as a network N = (G 
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(V, L), W, P). W represents edge characteristics; in this instance, the number of loan deals 
between two clubs and P identifies node information, such as the club name. Additionally, P 
will capture the exogenous information such as local metrics associated with the topological 
properties of the nodes (clubs) within the loan network structure. To analyse the topological 
properties of the global and local structure, the ‘sna' (Butts, 2016) and ‘tnet’ (Opsahl, 2009) 
packages in R, and the UCINet programme (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) were utilised. 
Network visualisations were created in Gephi (Bastian, Heymann, & Jacomy, 2009). The 
following network measures were applied (the mathematical notation and technical details of 
these measures are in the online supplementary information); 
Global Measures
Average Degree – The most straightforward network measure is merely the number of 
connections a node has in a network or degree. Once worked out at an individual level, it can 
be averaged to provide a global metric comparable to other networks. In this case, the average 
degree demonstrates the number of loan partners a club has been involved.
Weighted Average Degree – By weighting the degree, this tells us the number of 
individual loan transactions a club has been involved. Therefore, similar to average degree, it 
can be averaged out over the whole network to provide a comparative global metric. Here it 
demonstrates the average number of loans a club has been involved in within the network.
Density – Perhaps the most communally used measure of global network properties of 
a structure in network theory is density. Graph density measures "…overall level of 
connectedness in a network" (Scott, 2017, p. 81). By measuring density, we compare the actual 
number of links present to that of a complete graph – where all nodes are connected. This 
measure provides a value between 0 and 1; 0 where no nodes are connected and 1 where all 
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nodes are connected (complete graph). In this instance, it tells us how connected the European 
loan network is.
Global Clustering Coefficient and Transitivity – Density is generally only concerned 
with the dyadic relation between two nodes, that is, how many edges are present in a network 
and gives us a fundamental measure. The global clustering coefficient, often referred to as 
transitivity, extends this measure encapsulating the density of triadic relations within the 
network by analysing the density of triplets. A triplet consists of three nodes either connected 
by two (open triplet) or three (closed triplet) edges, and a triangle consists of three closed 
triplets. The global clustering coefficient based on Luce and Perry (1949) original work, 
measures the number of closed triplets over the total number of triplets present in the whole 
network (both open and closed). However, the global clustering coefficient does not account 
for the weight of connections, leading Opsahl and Panzarasa (2009) to generalise the global 
clustering coefficient for weighted networks by taking the total value of closed triplets. In both 
instances, these measures provide the same output 0 – 1, 1 identifying all triplets are closed, 
and  0 representing an unconnected network.
Triad Census – The global clustering coefficient measures transitivity by comparing 
only two types of triadic relations, open and closed. However, there are numerous other 
combinations of triadic relations. In fact, Wasserman and Faust (2009) identify 16 different 
configurations following Holland and Leinhardt (1976) MAN convention. MAN stands for 
Mutual – number of reciprocated ties, Asymmetric – number of unreciprocated ties and Null – 
number of no ties. Therefore, to better understand the global structure of the loan system, we 
also need to understand all the configurations of triads, above and beyond merely open and 
closed. Figure 1 demonstrates the multiple configurations, with 030T, 120D, 120U, 300 types 
demonstrate transitive configurations, meaning each node in the triad shares resources with 
one another.  Based on these configurations, Batagelj and Mrvar (2001) developed a 
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sophisticated algorithm to count the number of times each configuration is present in the 
network, providing a count for each configuration.  
[Figure 1 Here]
Local Measures
While it is essential to understand the global structure of the European loan network, local 
measures can provide more insight into the roles and positions of individual clubs within the 
network. The most common endogenous network properties are those associated with 
centrality, which is central within the network and has access to more resources and 
information. Generally, there are four primary metrics, which measure how central a node is 
within the network, or how central a club is within the loan system in this instance. The four 
common metrics are;
Degree centrality – measures the connectedness of a node – or the number of loan 
partners a club has within the loan network. Generally, those with more connections are more 
powerful than those with fewer connections as they influence many rather than the few 
(Newman, 2010). As the metric is based on the number connections, a node has, and for better 
interpretation of results, it can be normalised to the whole network. Within a directed network, 
there are two measures of degree centrality; in-degree – the number of arcs pointing into a 
node, and, out-degree – the number of arcs exiting a node. Therefore, in-degree for the 
European loan network represents the total number of football players borrowed by a club, and, 
out-degree shows the total number of football players loaned by a club.  
Closeness centrality – refers to the topological distance, or how close a node is to all 
other nodes based on the steps required for node i to reach node j, often termed geodesic 
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distance. This is the shortest path between two nodes, and the inverse average geodesic distance 
of a node provides a proximity score, higher-scoring nodes are more central within the network. 
Similar to degree centrality, within a directed network there are two different aspects of 
closeness, in- and out-, therefore, the geodesic distance for node i and j may differ depending 
on the nodal order. Therefore, we calculate in-closeness ( representing clubs receiving players) 
and out-closeness (representing clubs providing players).
Betweenness centrality – shows a node's importance through connecting unconnected 
nodes – or a clubs that sit between two unconnected clubs, which is a basic measure for Burt 
(1992, 2004) structural holes. Following the idea of geodesic distance, betweenness centrality 
measures a node's centrality based on how many times a node is present on the geodesic path 
between unconnected nodes j and k. Since node i sits between two unconnected nodes j and k, 
this provides node i an advantaged position and thus strategic implications. The betweenness 
centrality measure represents the proportion of geodesic distances i is involved in throughout 
the network (Vega-Redondo, 2007).
Beta centrality – also known as, Bonacich centrality or Bonacich power (Bonacich, 
2007), identifies the influence and importance of a node through its neighbours – or how 
powerful a club is depending on the centrality of its loan partners (cf. Jackson, 2008). Similar 
to Burt’s focus on the degree of a node’s alters, (Bonacich, 1972b, 1972a, 1987, 2007) proposed 
measures of centrality using the degree of a node’s alters. Here, power is derived by being 
connected to well-connected others (power) or being connected to poor-connected others 
(dependency). Assigning a positive parameter measures ‘power’ – power comes from 
influential friends, whereas, a negative parameter measures ‘dependency’ – power comes from 
weak friends as they are more dependent on the relationship. 
Results
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The full loan network has been mapped in Figure 2, and the measures are presented in Table 
1. The density of the loan system is 0.007, that is only 0.007% of possible ties are present. This 
suggests the loan system represents a sparse network compared to a complete network, 
suggesting clubs only enter into a loan agreement with relatively few clubs. The global 
clustering coefficient is 0.158, suggesting 15.8% of triplets are closed. This points to clubs 
working together to share talent resource (players). Furthermore, when the weight of ties is 
incorporated, the generalised global clustering coefficient is higher at 0.196 or 19.6% of triplets 
being closed, demonstrating clubs who belong to a closed triplet share more resource, id est, 
clubs loan multiple players to the same clubs, or what is known as transitivity. 
However, the clustering coefficient does not identify the make-up of the closed triplets, 
that is, the different combinations of mutual, asymmetric and null ties. The triad census results 
show there is a tendency for the closed triplets to be transitive with transitive combinations 
030T, 120D, 120U and 300 (see Figure 1), being the majority of the triads within the network. 
This identifies a hierarchy within the network, specifically the 030T (7776) and the 120U 
(1495) types. Interestingly, forty 300 types exist, implying there are 40 cliques within the 
network. This is an important finding as it demonstrates a specific structure to loan transactions, 
which shows the mutual sharing of talent resource. The implication here is various clubs 




The results presented in Table 2 show the structure of the loan system within each 
European league under investigation. The density of each is relatively comparable, which is 
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mainly due to the sensitivity of the number of clubs involved in each network. Nevertheless, 
each league has sparse connections to the number of clubs within the network. The Premier 
League and Serie A have very similar topologies, both having >3 average degree, meaning 
each club on average has three loan partner clubs. Similarly, they both have similar weighted 
average degree >6, suggesting on average each club is involved in 6 loans. Unlike Bundesliga, 
La Liga and Ligue 1 who have <3 loan partners, and loan <3 players on average, except for 
Bundesliga who loan approximately 4 on average. The global clustering coefficients are all 
comparable suggesting between 9% - 10.1% of triplets in each network are closed. However, 
Serie A is far more clustered than any of the other European leagues with 24.4% of the triplets 
closed within the network. This is a peculiarity suggesting that clubs are sharing much more 
playing talent through the loan system within Italy than across Europe. When we account for 
the generalised global clustering coefficient only the Premier League demonstrate a higher 
score, suggesting a tendency for clubs to share more playing talent when they belong to a closed 
triplet, rather than an open triplet – or, they loan more players to clubs who are also 
interconnected.  
[Table 2 Here]
The local measure analysis broke the network down even further and looked to analyse the 
position clubs take within the network.
Degree Centrality 
The results for degree centrality are presented in Table 3 for out-degree centrality 
(lending players), and Table 4 for in-degree centrality (borrowing players). Analysing the out-
degree centrality of clubs (Table 3.), it is evident that a few clubs are capitalising on the loan 
system by lending exponentially more players, namely Juventus (Italy) (= 0.012), Atlanta 
(Italy) (= 0.009), and Chelsea (England) (= 0.009). Furthermore, over the period analysed, 
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Juventus have engaged in 358 loan agreements to 135 different clubs, which is substantially 
more than Chelsea who has engaged 263 loan agreements, but across 139 different clubs – 
which is a different strategy to the other network voracious loaner, Juventus. This is somewhat 
contrary to clubs who receive loan players (Table 4.), as 17 clubs generally have similar 
normalised in-degree scores (= 0.02). However, certain clubs take loan players from a wider 
dispersion of clubs, such as Deportivo (Spain), Huddersfield (England), and Hellas Verona 
(Italy), lending players from 34, 32 and 31 different clubs respectively. More generally, based 
on in-degree centrality, it is clear there is a propensity for Italian clubs to engage in loan 
agreements, both lending and borrowing playing talent. Specifically, three Italian clubs 





 The results for closeness centrality are presented in Table 5. Similarly to degree centrality, 
there is a clear tendency for lending clubs to be more central, thus, influential within the 
network. Individually, Chelsea has the greatest access to the network (= .394), showing they 
occupy the shortest paths of 39.4% of connections throughout the European loan network. 
Moreover, compared to degree centrality, we start to see the emergence of Europe's high 
performing clubs, with England's Manchester City, Liverpool and Arsenal, along with Spain's 
Barcelona, Real Madrid and Atletico Madrid all having considerable access to resources in the 
network. Interestingly, Spain's emergence is also apparent within the in-closeness scores, 
showing they are well connected within the loan network and can access loan providers. Again, 
Italy is utilising the loan system more than other European leagues, as clubs such as AC Milan, 
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The results for betweenness centrality are presented in Table 6. Roma's apparent influential 
position is emphasised when considering those clubs in the network that connect otherwise 
unconnected clubs, with a betweenness centrality score = 2.707. While the expected Italian 
clubs (Juventus, Genoa, AC Milan, Chievo, Hellas Verona and Inter Milan) hold advantageous 
positions, interestingly Chelsea does not. Instead, English clubs Watford, Swansea and West 
Ham occupy more advantageous positions. Furthermore, Monaco (France) can draw power 
from the loan network through betweenness, which until now has gone unnoticed.
[Table 6 here]
Beta Centrality 
 The results for beta centrality are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Firstly, understanding power 
based on the notion that being connected to well-connected others derives power, we assigned 
a positive parameter  = 0.0403619. Taking this view of deriving power from others, Udinese 
and Inter Milan (Italy) are connected to the strongest others concerning lending players. Again, 
Italian clubs are extremely interconnected – as seen in Graph 1 – evidences the structural 
embeddedness of the loan system within Italian football. Furthermore, English clubs Chelsea, 
Manchester City and Arsenal, are drawing power through their loan strategy, lending to other 
central clubs. Indeed, in-degree beta centrality further reinforces the embeddedness of the loans 
system within Italy, with the most central clubs borrowing players all being Italian.   
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However, taking the view that power is derived by lending players to clubs who are not 
well connected – or the dependence view – the results differ. Here we assigned a negative 
parameter = -0.0403619. Firstly, considering lending players, Juventus still demonstrate their 
integral dominance in the loans market, not only being the most active lending players to 
already well-connected clubs, but they also connect poorly-connected club, meaning they are 
‘dependent' on the relationship with Juventus. Moreover, English clubs are dominant, which 
could demonstrate lending players out strategically, meaning they have power through 
dependence. In terms of borrowing players from weakly connected clubs, Deportivo top the 
list across Europe. Interestingly, smaller clubs from England move up in terms of dependency 
power, such as Brighton and Hove Albion, West Ham, Watford, Huddersfield and Leicester. 
These are all clubs who have been promoted to top-flight English football, so potentially are at 
the start of developing their loan network. Importantly, Roma also has a high dependency 
score, reinforcing their strong position in the loan network across Europe. Interestingly, Chievo 
can derive considerable dependence power from the loan system by lending and borrowing 
players to/from relatively unconnected clubs, meaning both their lending and borrowing 
partner clubs are dependent on their relationship with Chievo. To that end, they represent some 




By conceptualising the European loan system as a cross-subsidisation mechanism, we can 
analyse the resource flow of playing talent, which adds to the literature on market restrictions 
within European sport (Szymanski, 2016; Szymanski & Kesenne, 2004; York & Miree, 2018; 
Wilson, Ramchandani & Plumley, 2018). Additionally, this research has applied a novel 
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approach to sports management research by using social network analysis to analyse the 
economic networks created by the European loan system, thus, also adds to the economic and 
social network literature (Knoke, 2012; Burt, 1992; Granovettor, 2017).
The findings from understanding the global whole network characteristics suggest 
support for Granovetter's (1985, 2017) argument that trust is required within any economic 
transaction, as the largest triad configurations are closed triplets. This demonstrates that loan 
agreements are entered into by interconnected clubs, and the more interconnectedness, the 
more loan agreements between clubs. This finding is also similar to Wäsche's (2015) work 
concluding more cooperation between organisations in closed triads. This may be a result of a 
loan agreement requiring a level of trust – the receiving club trust that the talent will be 
adequate playing standard, and the loaning club trust the receiver will provide enough support 
and development. Again, this aligns to Granovetter's conjecture that trust in a network leads 
people to co-operate and otherwise act more benignly towards one another. This co-operation 
saves substantial costs of precaution and monitoring that would be expended without it – or in 
this instance, saves time entering into ineffective loan agreements. 
Furthermore, the implication of transitivity in the network means clubs tend to loan 
more players to those clubs in their closed group. This could demonstrate the strategic nature 
of the loan system; a strategy based on relationships rather than based on rational or random 
choices. Additionally, clubs need to strategise their loan policy and practice to ensure a position 
within the network. Furthermore, it could allude to peer-effects within the loan system, 
whereby loan transactions of one club are effected by another club. However, further research 
is needed to identify the role of peer-effect within the loan system specifically.
Analysing the local position and the role each club plays within the loan system 
demonstrates the cross-subsidising nature of the loan system, with those occupying powerful 
positions loaning players out being higher revenue-generating clubs, and those occupying 
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influential positions receiving loans lower revenue-generating clubs (Simmons, 2007). 
Furthermore, the local node level analysis demonstrated a considerable level of embeddedness 
within the Italian loan system. Suggesting the loan marker in Italy is not necessarily bound by 
utility maximisation principles, but actors are deeply interconnected, which will undoubtedly 
impact behaviour and access to information (Knoke, 2012; Granovetter, 2017). Additionally, 
powerful actors in this market will become sources of power through preferential attachment 
(Bonacich, 1987; Scott, 2011).
The loan system is a fundamental part of Italian football, which is demonstrated 
by the consistent dominance within the results. Although this probably reflects the local loan 
agreement policies operated by the Italian Football Association, the implications are that Italian 
clubs are central to the European loan system. Therefore, any changes to regulations enforced 
by football governing bodies could affect Italian football clubs exponentially more than any 
others across Europe.
There are some clubs in very exploitable positions, mainly Juventus who regardless of 
the conceptualisation of power (strong or weak connected friends; Bonacich, 1987), 
consistently occupy a position of advantage (Burt, 1992). They structurally positioned within 
a ‘structural hole' as they consistently connected multiple networks that are largely separated 
from one another. Therefore, they enjoy a strategic advantage (Granovetter, 2017; Burt, 1992). 
As a result, Granovetter (2017) notes that individuals in these situations can be effective 
brokers and thereby enjoy substantial social capital. This means they can extract the most value 
from the system.
While other clubs are clearly well embedded and powerful within the network - such 
as Chelsea FC, Roma, AC Milan, Inter Milan, Manchester City to name a few - none are as 
dominant as Juventus. Especially as they not only supply clubs which have many other 
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connections – or power (Bonacich, 1987) but also supply those with few connections – 
dependency (Bonacich, 1987). Showing they supply talent resource to other clubs who are in 
powerful positions in the network, as well as providing players to clubs in weak network 
positions. The latter is an essential consideration as changing regulations on loan agreements 
could have detrimental effects to those poorly positioned clubs who are reliant on loan 
agreements with well-connected suppliers of resource, such as Juventus. While regulation to 
limit the influence of dominant clubs in the loan market may be the desired goal, without 
reflecting on the network structure they may merely add to the difficulties of the smaller clubs 
they are trying to protect.
Interestingly, while many clubs extract value from the network – mostly the high 
revenue-generating clubs – numerous clubs are creating value within the system. These are 
clubs who take loan players and have strategic positions by doing so. For example, Spanish 
clubs Deportivo and Granada, along with English clubs Brighton & Hove Albion, Watford and 
Huddersfield, join Italian clubs, Genoa, Hellas Verona, Roma and Fiorentina in the most 
strategic positions, as these all receive playing talent from clubs who are not well connected, 
therefore are reliant on them to loan players to, creating their own power (Bonacich, 1987). 
Additionally, Juventus again occupy an advantageous position in terms of borrowing players, 
suggesting they have established a strategy on both sides of the loan system. Therefore, they 
clearly understand the importance of the structural position, developing a talent policy to reflect 
not only providing players to clubs but also taking players.
Implications
This paper begins to fill this gap by providing an initial analysis of the current structure 
of the loan system, meaning football’s stakeholders, particularly governing bodies, clubs, and 
player representatives can be better informed when managing, operating or regulating the loan 
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system. The implications of this research are fourfold: recommendations for executive-level 
professionals in the football industry and how to maximise the structure of the system; 
considerations for UEFA and FIFA policy around regulations applied to loan systems; 
application of economic network theory to the trading (loan) system in European football; and 
recommendations for future academic research.
Based on the findings within this study, executive-level professionals need to 
understand the (un)intended consequences of engaging in loan agreements; either as a talent 
resource supply or talent development initiative. For example, loaning a player to a club who 
has limited connections can offer a dominant position as they are reliant on the talent resource. 
Similarly, borrowing a player from a club with limited connections can provide the same 
advantageous position. Therefore, club executives need to understand their network when 
considering engaging in loan agreements. Primarily, we recommend clubs should have a 
strategy regarding loan agreements as well as consider employing a loan manager to manage 
such transactions, much like the model employed by Juventus.
Likewise, since football’s governing bodies such as FIFA and UEFA are currently 
considering regulating the loan system, they also need to understand the consequences of doing 
so entirely. While this research does not explicitly investigate the consequences of regulation; 
it does provide useful insight for governing bodies and league management. For example, the 
negative beta centrality results in Tables 8 indicate those clubs who are dependent on their 
relationships through loans for talent supply. Consequently, regulating the loan system may 
negatively affect those who are more dependent on loans such as Deportivo, Brighton & Hove 
Albion and Granada, among others. Indeed, consideration also needs to be given to those clubs 
who are dependent on supplying talent, which is most Italian clubs, specifically Juventus, 
Atlanta, Chievo and Sampdoria. Indeed, football’s governing bodies, technical directors and 
individual club sporting directors must be cognizant that while a strategy is needed regarding 
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player loans; it also needs to be contextualised around broader club level implications on talent 
pathways, such as blocking players transitioning from the academy to the first team. 
We have shown how the loan system can be contextualised as a cross-subsidisation 
system, much like others operating across global professional sport, such as draft systems and 
revenue sharing agreements. However, it provides some distinct nuances which need to be 
explored fully. By applying economic network theory, we have provided the first descriptive 
analysis of how the loan system is structured and been able to identify the critical clubs 
involved in the flow of playing talent through the system. Further research is required to 
understand implications of position in the network, answering questions such as; does an 
advantaged network position lead to better performance (both financially and ‘on-field’)? Are 
loan transactions of clubs influenced by the loan transactions of others? How do other 
regulations such as Financial Fair Play (FFP) influence the behaviour of clubs in the loan 
network?
Conclusions
This is the first research to conceptualise the loan system within European football as a cross-
subsidisation mechanism, similar to other market restrictions such as revenue sharing, draft 
systems and salary caps. By taking this view, we can map the flow of resource through network 
analysis. This paper has presented the European loan system as a resource-sharing network by 
taking the top-5 European leagues (English Premier League, Spanish La Liga, Italian Serie A, 
German Bundesliga, and French Ligue 1) as the network boundary. This has provided some 
insightful description of the structure the loan system creates, from a global whole-network 
approach it shows clubs tend to share more playing resource with clubs they trust, or clubs who 
are in a closed triad. 
Page 25 of 51
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/resm





























































For Peer Review Only
From a local individual club level, it identifies how the loan system is more embedded 
within individual leagues, specifically the Italian Serie A. While potentially reflecting 
unstandardised loan agreement practices across Europe, it highlights a high level of 
cooperation and collaboration within Italian football, more than any other European league. 
Furthermore, it shows the exploitive position large revenue-generating clubs have, especially 
Juventus whose power and influence goes beyond the mere volume of players loaned out, 
ultimately they have strategised the loan system. However, this research does not go beyond 
describing the loan system's dynamics; therefore, further research should aim to ascertain the 
implications that network positions have on organisational, financial and team performance.
Notably, interpretation is somewhat limiting due to the static nature of social network 
analysis. Hence, without comparison, it is hard to establish whether the findings are different 
from what would be typically or theoretically expected. Therefore, future work should look at 
exponential random graph models or longitudinal (dynamic) network analysis to establish 
consequences of network position. Additionally, sports economists should treat the loan system 
as a cross-subsidisation mechanism and provide the same level of analysis and scrutiny other 
mechanisms have received. Further research is also needed to understand the potential impacts 
of any regulation changes to the loan system, especially on the smaller revenue-generating 
teams who are reliant on the loan system. Finally, specific network research identifying 
equivalence, peer-effects, and, performance-related implications of the loan system would 
further this work.
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Figure 1. Batagelj and Mrvar’s (2001) Triad Census Configurations 
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Figure 2. The European Football Loan Network 
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Table 1. Global measures results 
Measure Result
Density 0.007 (0.7%)
Global Clustering Coefficient 0.158 (15.8%)

















Note: * configurations demonstrate transitivity.
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Weighted Av. Degree 6.33
Global Clustering Coefficient 0.096
Premier League
Generalised Global Clustering Coefficient 0.123
Density 0.007
Av. Degree 3.69
Weighted Av. Degree 6.79
Global Clustering Coefficient 0.244
Serie A
Generalised Global Clustering Coefficient 0.247
Density 0.008
Av. Degree 2.66
Weighted Av. Degree 4.66
Global Clustering Coefficient 0.101
La Liga
Generalised Global Clustering Coefficient 0.092
Density 0.009
Av. Degree 2.34
Weighted Av. Degree 2.93
Global Clustering Coefficient 0.092
Bundesliga
Generalised Global Clustering Coefficient 0.089
Density 0.008
Av. Degree 2.32
Weighted Av. Degree 3.01
Av. Clustering Coefficient 0.106
Ligue 1
Generalised Global Clustering Coefficient 0.084
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Table 3. Top-20 clubs based on out-degree 
Club Degree Weighted Degree Normalised Degree Country
Juventus 135 358 0.012 Italy
Atalanta 96 266 0.009 Italy
Chelsea 139 263 0.009 England
Udinese 126 231 0.008 Italy
Genoa 105 221 0.007 Italy
Manchester City 116 216 0.007 England
Chievo 89 215 0.007 Italy
Roma 105 215 0.007 Italy
AC Milan 104 195 0.006 Italy
Sampdoria 91 189 0.006 Italy
Inter Milan 84 175 0.006 Italy
Napoli 96 169 0.006 Italy
Arsenal 101 159 0.005 England
Fiorentina 86 148 0.005 Italy
Tottenham Hotspur 89 147 0.005 England
Liverpool 93 142 0.005 England
Manchester United 70 141 0.005 England
Torino 80 138 0.005 Italy
Bologna 67 132 0.004 Italy
West Ham United 75 130 0.004 England
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Table 4. Top-20 clubs based on in-degree 
Club Degree Weighted Degree Normalised Degree Country
Crotone 23 74 0.002 Italy
Cesena 16 66 0.002 Italy
Hellas Verona 31 63 0.002 Italy
Carpi 16 60 0.002 Italy
Deportivo 34 58 0.002 Italy
Bari 1908 15 57 0.002 Italy
Brighton & Hove Albion 27 56 0.002 England
Huddersfield Town 32 56 0.002 England
Perugia 17 55 0.002 Italy
Genoa 29 54 0.002 Italy
Granada 22 53 0.002 Spain
SPAL 22 53 0.002 Italy
Bologna 25 52 0.002 Italy
Chievo 28 51 0.002 Italy
Watford 26 51 0.002 England
Sampdoria 29 49 0.002 Italy
Pescara 14 48 0.002 Italy
Livorno 14 45 0.001 Italy
Pro Vercelli 13 45 0.001 Italy
Roma 35 45 0.001 Italy
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Table 5. Top 20 central clubs based on closeness centrality
Out-Closeness In-Closeness
1 Chelsea 0.394 England 1 Bologna 0.147 Italy
2 AC Milan 0.37 Italy 2 Fiorentina 0.147 Italy
3 Manchester City 0.367 England 3 Genoa 0.147 Italy
4 Juventus 0.363 Italy 4 Granada 0.147 Spain
5 Liverpool 0.362 England 5 Hellas Verona 0.147 Italy
6 Arsenal 0.361 England 6 Levante 0.147 Spain
7 Roma 0.356 Italy 7 Mallorca 0.147 Spain
Udinese 0.356 Italy 8 AC Milan 0.146 Italy
8 Napoli 0.352 Italy 9 Cagliari 0.146 Italy
9 Inter Milan 0.346 Italy 10 Chievo 0.146 Spain
10 Barcelona 0.344 Spain 11 Crotone 0.146 Italy
Benfica 0.342 Portugal 12 Córdoba 0.146 Spain
Tottenham Hotspur 0.342 England 13 Deportivo La Coruña 0.146 Italy
11 Monaco 0.341 France 14 Gijón 0.146 Spain
12 Real Madrid 0.339 Spain 15 Inter Milan 0.146 Italy
13 Atlético Madrid 0.338 Spain 16 Leganés 0.146 Spain
14 Manchester United 0.336 England 17 Málaga 0.146 Spain
15 Genoa 0.335 Italy 18 Perugia 0.146 Italy
16 Sunderland 0.332 England 19 Real Betis 0.146 Spain
17 Lazio 0.331 Italy 20 Roma 0.146 Italy
Sampdoria 0.331 Italy
Wolfsburg 0.331 Germany
18 Valencia 0.329 Spain
19 Fiorentina 0.328 Italy
19 Swansea City 0.328 England
20 PSG 0.326 France
Porto 0.326 Portugal
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Table 6. Top 20 clubs based on betweenness centrality 
Club Betweenness Normalised Betweenness Country
1 Roma 34471.56 2.707 Italy
2 Juventus 31310.28 2.459 Italy
3 Monaco 29414.95 2.31 France
4 Genoa 25134.22 1.974 Italy
5 Fiorentina 24108.37 1.893 Italy
6 AC Milan 22867.88 1.796 Italy
7 Chievo 22801.71 1.79 Italy
8 Udinese 19498.52 1.531 Italy
9 Sevilla 18370.94 1.443 Spain
10 Cagliari 18045.68 1.417 Italy
11 Villarreal 17327.02 1.361 Spain
12 Valencia 17155.7 1.347 Spain
13 Watford 16899.62 1.327 England
14 Hellas Verona 16542.89 1.299 Italy
15 Inter Milan 15976.63 1.255 Italy
16 Swansea City 15831.79 1.243 England
17 Real Madrid 15828.3 1.243 Spain
18 West Ham United 15262.76 1.198 England
19 Granada 14247.89 1.119 Spain
20 Bologna 14053.63 1.104 Italy
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Table 7. Top 20 clubs based on beta centrality with a positive parameter
In-Beta (+) Out-Beta(+)
1 Crotone 8.095 Italy 1 Udinese 12.174 Italy
2 Cesena 7.554 Italy 2 Inter Milan 12.024 Italy
3 Carpi 6.694 Italy 3 Juventus 10.556 Italy
4 SPAL 6.266 Italy 4 Genoa 9.905 Italy
5 Bari 1908 5.893 Italy 5 AC Milan 8.469 Italy
6 Perugia 5.317 Italy 6 Roma 7.927 Italy
7 Juve Stabia 5.228 Italy 7 Napoli 7.851 Italy
8 Livorno 5.153 Italy 8 Chelsea 7.181 England
9 Pro Vercelli 4.989 Italy 9 Sampdoria 6.822 Italy
10 Pescara 4.949 Italy 10 Fiorentina 6.58 Italy
11 Modena 4.888 Italy 11 Atalanta 5.834 Italy
12 Hellas Verona 4.801 Italy 12 Chievo 4.822 Italy
13 Brescia 4.722 Italy 13 Palermo 4.704 Italy
14 Lanciano 4.702 Italy 14 Lazio 4.477 Italy
15 Bologna 4.672 Italy 15 Torino 3.337 Italy
16 Sampdoria 4.618 Italy 16 Manchester City 3.295 England
17 Latina 4.612 Italy 17 Catania 3.171 Italy
18 Como 4.43 Italy 18 Arsenal 3.153 England
19 Chievo 4.138 Italy 19 Parma Calcio 1913 3.149 Italy
20 Spezia 4.118 Italy 20 Cagliari 2.993 Italy
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Table 8. Top 20 clubs based on beta centrality with a negative parameter
In-Beta (-) Out-Beta (-)
1 Deportivo 6.321 Spain 1 Juventus 11.789 Italy
2 Brighton & Hove Albion 5.637 England 2 Atalanta 11.74 Italy
3 Granada 5.409 Spain 3 Chievo 9.147 Italy
4 Watford 5.229 England 4 Sampdoria 8.177 Italy
5 Genoa 5.194 Italy 5 Crystal Palace 5.612 England
6 Hellas Verona 5.061 Italy 6 West Ham United 5.516 England
7 Huddersfield Town 5.036 England 7 Torino 5.439 Italy
8 West Ham United 5.029 England 8 Watford 5.115 England
9 Roma 4.522 Italy 9 Burnley 5.099 England
10 Fiorentina 4.421 Italy 10 Leicester City 5.027 England
11 Vitesse 4.161 Italy 11 AFC Bournemouth 4.992 England
12 Leicester City 4.083 England 12 Roma 4.621 Italy
13 Crotone 3.858 Italy 13 Huddersfield Town 4.56 England
14 Sampdoria 3.795 Italy 14 Udinese 4.522 Italy
15 Real Betis 3.73 Spain 15 Newcastle United 4.503 England
16 Chievo 3.693 Italy 16 Manchester City 4.458 England
17 Girona 3.657 Italy 17 West Bromwich Albion 4.224 England
18 CD Leganés 3.617 Italy 18 Tottenham Hotspur 4.182 England
19 Cagliari 3.393 Italy 19 Hellas Verona 4.15 Italy
20 Juventus 3.335 Italy 20 AC Milan 4.088 Italy
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Mathmatical notation for network measures
Density
To measure density By measuring density, we compare the actual number of links present to 
that of a complete graph – where all nodes are connected to each other. In this instance, it tells 
us how connected the European loan network is. As the network is directed, then density equals 
the proportion of edges present (L) divided by the maximum possible number of edges (in a 
complete graph). As edges are ordered pairs of nodes (g), there are g(g – 1) possible number 





with a range of 0 – 1, where 0 demonstrates no edges are present, and 1 all nodes are present. 
Global Clustering Coefficient and Transitivity 
The global clustering coefficient based on Luce and Perry's (1949) original work, measures the 
number of closed triplets over the total number of triplets present in the whole network (both 
open and closed). Using the unweighted digraph, the global clustering coefficient  can be (𝐶)
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where  is the total number of triplets and  is the total number of closed triplets. ∑𝜏 ∑𝜏∆
However, the global clustering coefficient does not account for the weight of connections, 
leading Opsahl and Panzarasa (2009) to generalize the global clustering coefficient for 
weighted networks by taking the total value of closed triplets ( compared to the total ∑𝜏∆𝜔)

















Within a directed network there are two measures of degree centrality; in-degree – the number 
of arcs pointing into a node, noted as , and, out-degree – the number of arcs exiting a ∑𝑁𝑗 ≠ 𝑖ℒ𝑗𝑖
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(6)
Closeness Centrality
This is the shortest path between two nodes, higher scoring nodes are more central within the 






Where  represents the geodesic distance between i and j. However, accounting for direction 𝒟𝑖𝑗
may mean different score depending on the order of nodes, thus , or . Therefore, in 𝒟𝑗𝑖 𝒟𝑖𝑗 ≠ 𝒟𝑗𝑖












The betweenness centrality measure represents the proportion of geodesic distances i is 
involved in throughout the network (Vega-Redondo, 2007), which de Benedictis and Tajoli 
(2011) provide a standardized measure of Freeman’s (1979) original work; 
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(𝑛 ― 1)(𝑛 ― 2)
(10)
with  noting the sum of geodesic distance between alters j and k, and  noting those 𝒟𝑗𝑘 𝒟𝑖𝑗𝑘
geodesic distances between j and k involving i. The higher the betweenness score the more 
central a node is, and the more advantageous their position. As nodes are already ordered there 
is no need for in- or out- measures (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). 
Beta centrality 
Beta centrality proposed by Bonacich (1987), also known as, Bonacich power or Bonacich 
centrality is expressed as Borgatti, Everett and Freeman (2002);  
𝐶𝑖𝑃 = ∑𝐴𝑖𝑗(𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑗)
(11)
with  being an arbitrary standardising constant, generally the Euclidean norm.  represents 𝛼 𝛽
the positive or negative parameter, to get  we follow Borgatti, Everett and Freeman (2002) 𝛽
using 1/(n – 1). 
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Reviewer: 1
Comments to the Author
Overall, the authors have done a good job in revising the manuscript.
 Thank you. 
The one comment I have is I feel the discussion of other sport studies using network analysis could 
still have some more depth and discussion. I think the authors feel that they are the first of these 
studies to do "economic sociology" because they are one of the first to use the phrase in this 
context. However, I would argue that many of these studies are based in economic sociology, they 
just do not explicitly mention it. This is especially the case considering that most of this lineage is 
influenced or derived from the works of Granovetter. At the same time, I do not think that this point 
is a major issue within the manuscript, and is more just the opinion of this reviewer in terms of what 
is truly the "first" sport economic sociology study using network analysis. Again, this is a matter of 
opinion that could be debated by many scholars with different answers.
 We appreciate the comment and understand the argument. We have re-written the part of 
the literature review dealing with network analysis in sport management (Pages 8 – 10) and 
reduced the claims within the paper accordingly. 
I would like to conclude in saying the authors have done a good job with their social network 
analysis, and it is good to rigorous studies in sport using this method.
 Thank you. 
Associate Editor Comments to the Author:
Thanks for revising the manuscript. In the response to reviewers, please always provide page 
numbers so that the changes can be found more quickly. 
1. I think that more detailed implications than the very broad form on p. 23. need to be added.
 We have provided more detailed implications on page 23, as well as adding a implications 
sub-heading. 
2. The theory added  is quite broad and related more to basics economics (with Neale and 
Rottenberg) rather than what is better suited to sport management. Please add a more 
specific theoretical foundation to your study that fits the empirical analysis. What network 
structure could be auggested/expected from a theoretical perspective?
 This paper is concerned with conceptualising the loan system as a cross-subsidisation system 
much like others operated across sport such draft systems. Therefore, it is imperative to 
establish this within the context of sport economic (management) literature such as Neale 
and Rottenberg. The theoretical framework comes from network theory which is covered in 
The Network Perspective section. Given the word count limit, we feel it is impractical to 
lengthen this section. Additionally, given the paper is providing an initial description of the 
network structure it would not prove useful at this point to postulate or hypothesise what 
the structure should be. Also, this would require significantly more sophisticated methods, 
namely Exponential Random Graph Models to statistically infer if the network structure 
differs from a pre-defined hypothesis. We have acknowledged this within the conclusion on 
page 26. 
Page 50 of 51
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/resm





























































For Peer Review Only
3. R1 has one point left which should be addressed. The statements re the study being the first 
etc. should be toned down and previous research should be better acknowledged in the 
discussion.
 We have re-written the ‘Networks and Sport Management Research’ section (pages 8 – 10) 
which reviewed the sport management literature explicitly in line with R1 comments above. 
We have also toned down the claims within the paper accordingly. 
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